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RECENT DECISIONS
PERFORMANCE-ATTORNEY'S
KNOWLEDGE IMPUTED To
appellant, Foster, contracted to sell her residence to the
appellee. A cashier's check for $1,000 was endorsed to her and deposited with a third party as earnest money. The title report showed
a conveyance to Mrs. Foster and her husband as joint tenants. Her
representative wrote requesting proof of her husband's death.
Irs.
Foster, without replying, left the city. Upon her return about two
weeks later she was advised that appellee wished to close the deal.
She then requested leave to remain in the house, rent free, for a
further period of two months. Appellee wrote agreeing to this and
again requesting a closing. On this same day, Mrs. Foster executed
a warranty deed conveying the property to the appellants, Burton and
wife, for substantially the same consideration as reserved in the first
contract. The attorney who appeared for all appellants represented the
Burtons in their dealings with Mrs. Foster. She told him of the
existing contract and received from him a written agreement by
which the Burtons were pledged to defend any actions and to assume
any liability that might result. -Upon learning of the conveyance,
appellee filed his bill for specific performance, naming Mrs. Foster and
the Burtons defendants. Held, that performance should be decreed
as recommended by the Master in Chancery. Judgment affirmed on
appeal. Hodes v. Foster, et al., 155 N. E. 762 (Sup. Ct. Ill. 1927).
The subsequent vendees were charged with the actual knowledge
of their attorney as to the existence of the prior contract. The Court
found no facts to indicate that the prior contract had been induced by
fraud or an inadequate consideration. Mrs. Foster had secured valuable concessions from the appellee and the repudiation was, in the
SPECIFIC

CLIENT-The

Court's opinion, but a scheme to deprive him of the benefits of his
bargain. Confronted by these findings, the Court held itself bound to
grant a decree.
The Court, in granting the decree, followed the general principle
laid down in an earlier Illinois case. Gladville v. McDole, 247 Ill.
34, 93 N. E. 86 (1910). The case also accords with recent decisions in
other jurisdictions upon analogous facts. Asher v. Roberts, 206 Ky.
186, 266 S. W. 1089 (1925); Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. American
Brick & Clay Mfg. Co., 280 Pa. 449, 124 AtI. 650 (1924); Collier v.
Moore, .31 Ga. App. 227, 120 S. E. 441 (1923); Leinbach v. Dyatt,
112 Kan., 782, 212 Pac. 894 (1923) ; Matthews v. Bartee 212 Ala. 667,
103 So. 874 (1925); Hansen v. Humphrey, 218 App. Div. 291, 218
N. Y. Supp. 197 (3rd Dept. 1926). The California Courts, going further, have decreed specific performance at the suit of a -son, to whom
a father had orally agreed to convey, against another son who subsequently took title with knowledge of the prior agreement. Peixouto v.
Peixouto, 40 Cal. App. 782, 181 Pac. 830 (1919). In Bispham's Principles of Equity (10th cd. 1922) Sec. 365, it is said that an alienee
with notice of the original contract is liable for its performance at
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the suit of the purchaser, and, apparently, no authority to the contrary has been found by the learned author.
Once the fact of knowledge is established, it would seem unfair
upon principle to deprive the original purchaser of his specific remedy
merely because the title has passed from the party with whom he contracted; nor should a subsequent vendee be heard to disclaim knowledge gained by an attorney within the apparent scope of his authority
while handling a matter entrusted to him.
2
82E As AFFECTING COMMON LAW
HIGHWAY LAW; SECTION
LIABILITY OF OWNER OF MOTOR VEHICLE-The action is to recover for

death alleged to have been occasioned through the negligent operation
of an automobile. The uncontradicted evidence necessitates the conclusion that the driver of the car was using it at the time of the accident
for his own purposes exclusively, without the permission and against
the commands of the defendant his employer. Held, The action would
not lie inasmuch as the plaintiff gained nothing by Sec. 282e of the
Highway Law (Cons. Law Chap. 25) providing that the owners of
motor vehicles, operated upon public highways, shall be liable for death
or injuries to person or property resulting from negligent operation
by any person legally using same with the permission, express or implied. of the owner. Judgment affirmed. Fluegel v. Coudert, 244 N.
Y. 392 (1927).
The Court held that the effect of the statute was to render obsolete the doctrine of such cases as Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.
Y., 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917); Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y., 431, 436,
116 N. E. 78 (1917), and that liability no longer depended on use or
operation by a servant in the "business" of a master, but upon its
legal use or operation in the business "or otherwise" of the master
with permission or consent. Thus the owner who loaned the car tb a
friend or an employee would be liable for the negligence of the operator though the loan was unrelated to employment and a mere friendly
accommodation. The father would be liable for the negligence of the
son to whom he had entrusted the use of the family automobile (Van
Blaricom v. Dodgson, supra). The Court significantly stated, "We
make no attempt at exhaustive enumeration. What has been said will
suffice for illustration or example." It would thus appear that the
Highway Law does not recognize such independent operation by a
gratuitous bailee as will relieve the bailor from liability for the
former's negligence, and the Court's opinion would seem to indicate
that the section is still charged with such pregnant possibilities as will
materially change the law of automobiles. 1 St. John's L. Rev., 53, 54
(1926).
SALES-ELECTION

OF REMEDIES--RIGHTS

OF

PARTIES-Defendant

sold to one Edgar an automobile under a conditional bill of sale contract. Edgar paid $50 in cash and gave a promissory note for the
balance of purchase price. The conditional sale contract provides
inter alia, that title should not pass until full price was paid, an
acceleration clause for balance in case of default. In event of such
default vendor may- take immediate possession of property with
privilege of resale, seller to have right to enforce any one or more

